Much has been written on the concept of ' 
Introduction
With regard to Old Testament wisdom there are several questions that are fundamental without being presumptuous, including the following:
Why did the biblical sages desire wisdom? Why was this wisdom associated with the acquisition of knowledge of how life works and knowing how to live as a result? Why was the beginning of wisdom said to be fear (understood as terror or respect)? Why was it considered evil and even dangerous to be unwise? Why was the moral order considered to be a persecutory dimension and personified wisdom as a woman who threatened those who failed to heed her demands? Why was the god of wisdom a scrutinizing judge primarily concerned with retribution?
The hypothesis of this study that links all of these questions is that at the heart of wisdom there lies, amongst others, a brooding paranoia. But even though positing a pathological condition at the roots of something as noble as the quest for wisdom may seem radical and deliberately provocative, the argument in favour of the conclusion involves the following simple line of reasoning: if we can agree that a) knowledge was assumed to be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for wisdom; and b) all knowledge is to some extent paranoiac in a Lacanian sense, then it follows that paranoia (a term not meant pejoratively in this article) is a jointly necessary condition for the desire for wisdom to exist. If this can be granted then perhaps the will to wisdom like that for knowledge might have partly pathological (paranoiac) origins. It is not as stereotypes suggest the morally laudable desire of a calm and collected mature subject.
To justify these outlandish ideas I shall look at the relationship paranoiac-knowledge and wisdom more closely. As illustration, I shall examine cases of possible paranoiac elements in certain propositions in the three Old Testament wisdom books. In this regard, I should stress outright that my claim is not that wisdom can be wholly equated with paranoia, that all paranoiac traits are necessarily pathological, or that the wisdom enterprise as such is psychologically dysfunctional. I am simply asking whether one of the motivating factors in the desire to be wise might be a latent paranoia in the Lacanian epistemological sense (for more on which, see below). I make no absolute claims in this regard -I only want to play with a radical notion for the novel and clarifying perspective, as well as the potent demystifying explanatory value it might offer on some aspects of biblical wisdom. I have very little invested in the theory other than the hope it might be interesting.
What is Lacanian Paranoia?
The word paranoia comes from the Greek 'παράνοια' (paranoia) popularly and etymologically explained as meaning to be beside oneself (i.e. mad). However, employed as an adjective in psychiatry, the term 'paranoid' has become attached to a diverse set of conditions, from paranoid schizophrenia, through paranoid depression, to paranoid personality -not to mention a motley collection of paranoid 'psychoses', 'reactions', and 'states'. As such, paranoia denotes a disorder which has been argued in and out of existence, and whose clinical features, course, boundaries, and virtually every other aspect of which are controversial.
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Of interest to this study is not a classical or prototypical definition of paranoia so much as what the psycho-analyst/philosopher Jacques Lacan had to say about its relation to knowledge. Lacan's linguistic reinterpretation of Freud profoundly changed the institutional face of the psychoanalytical movement internationally. His seminars in the 1950s were one of the formative environments of the currency of philosophical ideas that dominated French humanities in the 1960s and '70s, and became known in the Anglophone world as 'post-structuralism.' 3 However, reconstructing a Lacanian theory on paranoia is no mean feat. Lacan is not very accessible and his writings offer no focused or systematic treatment of paranoia. As a result he invites controversy 4 and is often misinterpreted.
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Lacan's comments on paranoiac knowledge are limited to a few fragments in his Écrits and his Seminars. Because his scant remarks on the subject have genuine theoretical value, however, it is my intention show how Lacan's insights might also have exegetical utility. Lacan's name has also become a dirty word among those who detest everything postmodern and reduce the latter to psychobabble. However, it is not relevant for our purposes whether Lacan was correct in all his views in order to appreciate what he has to offer to our topic at hand. Notwithstanding some valid critique against his work, Lacan is to my mind an important figure to engage with in any discussion about the psychological foundations of wisdom epistemology.
Gericke
Lacan himself seemed not to differentiate much between different types and subtypes of paranoia when he linked it to knowledge. According to Mills, 6 this is evident when looking at the knowledge-paranoia relation in the context of Lacan's three registers or orders:
Developmentally, knowledge is paranoiac because it involves an illusory self-recognition of autonomy, control, and mastery, thus leading to persecutory anxiety and selfalienation. Secondarily, through the symbolic structures of language and speech, desire is foisted upon the knowing subject as a foreboding demand threatening to invade and destroy uniquely subjective inner experiences. And finally, the process of knowing itself is paranoiac because it horrifically confronts the real, namely, the unknown. Our primary interest here lies with the first register where paranoiac knowledge is most visible, i.e. the imaginary. Imaginary knowledge is based on a fantasy of self-mastery and unity and is constitutive of the ego.
7 It is paranoiac because it has the same structure as paranoia (both involve the delusion of absolute knowledge and mastery), and because one of the preconditions of all human knowledge is the 'paranoiac alienation of the ego.' 8 What Lacan calls 'the mirror stage' lays the foundation for paranoiac knowledge.
9 To be human involves being paranoid insofar as members of the species are haunted by the sense of an 'other' who influences their thoughts and actions. The basic idea can be illustrated in comic fashion with a bit of psycho-analytic humour from the popularizer and disciple of Lacan, Slavoj Žižek:
A man who believes himself to be a grain of seed is taken to the mental institution where the doctors do their best to finally convince him that he is not a grain but a man; however, when he is cured (convinced that he is not a grain of seed but a man) and allowed to leave the hospital, he immediately comes back very trembling of scare -there is a chicken outside the door and that he is afraid that it would eat him. 'Dear fellow,' says his doctor, 'you know very well that you are not a grain of seed but a man'. 'Of course I know that,' replies the patient, 'but does the chicken know it?' 10 This story is used by psychoanalysts to exemplify the key role of the Other's knowledge and the theory that all knowledge is imbued with paranoia. We need the image of ourselves "in order to establish relationships with other people and in order to negotiate the physical and social reality of our world." 11 This need arises from the fact that as infants we cannot fend for ourselves, and this sense of 'organic insufficiency' persists throughout our lives. In this respect, we are also 'haunted' by nature, by the physical vulnerability and mortality against which our self-concepts, relationships, and myriad strategies of personal care and defense must ultimately fail to protect us.
12 As a result, we want to know how to live and master the art of living (hence wisdom). The question now is to what extent wisdom can be linked to knowledge and whether there are indications of a connection between wisdom and paranoia in the episteme of OT wisdom itself. 6 Mills, Lacan on paranoiac knowledge, 31. 
Knowledge and Fear as Necessary Condition for Wisdom in Proverbs
This section has three related objectives: 1) showing how being wise and knowing are linked in philosophical perspectives on the phenomenon of wisdom; 2) showing how wisdom and knowledge are related in some texts in the Book of Proverbs and 3) showing that in the latter case the connection can be correlated with the concept of the fear of Yhwh. With regard to the first objective, many views in the historical and contemporary philosophical literature on wisdom have knowledge as a necessary condition for being wise.
13 All of these views, however, clearly distinguish knowledge from mere expertise on some subject. Moreover, all of these views maintain that wise people know 'what is important.'
14 The views differ, for the most part, over what it is that the wise person must know and whether there is any action that is required for wisdom. The bottom line here is that a wise person is thought to be someone who knows a lot about the Universe and our place in it. The main problem here, of course is that some of the most knowledgeable people are not wise.
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Already Aristotle was well aware of the limitations of equating wisdom with knowledge as such. As a result, he made a distinction between theoretical and practical wisdom.
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Whereas theoretical wisdom approximates speculative philosophy, practical wisdom is closer to biblical wisdom in that it requires knowing, in general, how to live well. Of course, in the OT, wisdom is also associated with both of the aforementioned types of knowledge (although theoretical foci are rare and the details and contents of such knowledge are often only implicit). This is most evident in proverbs featuring synonymous and synthetic parallelisms, as the following decontextualized examples (amongst others) clearly show. None of these, however, overtly links knowledge to fear:
For Yhwh gives wisdom; from his mouth come knowledge and understanding (Prov 2:10) For wisdom will come into your heart, and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul (Prov 2:16) A scoffer seeks wisdom in vain, but knowledge is easy for a man of understanding (Prov 14:6) A wise man is mightier than a strong man, and a man of knowledge than he who has strength (Prov 24:5) 13 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941 , 935-1112 ; René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, in Philosophical Works, E Haldane and G Ross, trans. and eds. (London: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 201-302, Richard Garrett, "Three Definitions of Wisdom", in , 221-232, John Kekes, "Wisdom", American Philosophical Quarterly, 20/3 (1983 , 277-286, Keith Lehrer, Jeannie Lum, Beverly A Slichta and Nicholas D Smith (eds.), Knowledge, Teaching, and Wisdom (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996) , Keith Lehrer and Nicholas Smith, "Introduction", in ,. 3-17, Norman Maxwell, From Knowledge to Wisdom (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994 In the Book of Proverbs, as in the history of psycho-analysis from Freud and Klein to Lacan, knowledge as such is a dialectical enterprise that actually stands in relation to fear, the latter being influential in paranoia. 17 The following texts (again, amongst others) are more forthcoming in the matter. The fear of Yhwh is the beginning of knowledge; fools despise wisdom and instruction (Prov 1:7) Because they hated knowledge and did not choose the fear of Yhwh (Prov 1:29) The fear of Yhwh is the beginning of wisdom, and the knowledge of the Holy One is insight (Prov 9:10) It is irrelevant whether we see fear here as pious respect or sheer terror.
18 It does not seem to be wrong to say that a Lacanian type of epistemological paranoia is related to the sages' attempt to manufacture a future-perfect mastery. Both from a philosophical perspective and in the Book of Proverbs, what a wise person needs to know and understand may constitute a varied list: The literature dealing with this concept is vast. Much of it is motivated by the need to argue in favour of a certain interpretation of the concept of fear, mostly to downplay any possible negative connotations relative to the love of God in modern biblical theism. For our purposes, the difference between terror and respect is irrelevant in the context of being a source of wisdom. To my mind in most cases in the text it is a case of both/and rather than either/or with regard to the terror/respect dichotomy.
The fear of Yhwh leads to life; and he who has it rests satisfied; he will not be visited by harm (Prov 19:23) The reward for humility and fear of Yhwh is riches and honor and life (Prov 22:4) Let not your heart envy sinners, but continue in the fear of Yhwh all the day (Prov 23:17) My son, fear Yhwh and the king, and do not disobey either of them (Prov 24:21) Blessed is the man who fears Yhwh always; but he who hardens his heart will fall into calamity (Prov 28:14) As in Lacan, knowledge as the fear of Yhwh is linked to paranoia in the sense of holding persecutory beliefs concerning the deity's judgments as a perceived threat. The processes of knowing are in themselves paranoiac because they confront the real and, in it, the god's mind as partly unknown. 20 And if the fear of Yhwh leads to life and safety than by counterfactual logic it follows that if one does not fear Yhwh and therefore begin in the quest for wisdom one is likely to attract the opposite, namely death and danger (presumably also by Yhwh's judgments, whether as cause or passive onlooker).
For a man's ways are before the eyes of Yhwh, and he watches all his paths (Prov 5:21) As in Lacan's theory of paranoiac knowledge there is no ultimate relief for the wise for both the father/teacher persona speaking in wisdom and the exalted Father in the sky are always watching, judging as ego ideals in the symbolic order. This ideal ego is also wisdom which is the ideal of perceived perfection that one strives to emulate. Yet believing this cannot but induce paranoia mythologically euphemised as the fear of Yhwh who personifies the source of wisdom. Given the fact that the instructions of the wise consist largely of warnings, prohibitions, catastrophizing and Foucauldian othering, the knowing subject who has internalized such wisdom qua fear will show mild symptoms of paranoid personality disorder. (S)he will be suspicious of other people, limit social life to avoid evil, feel in danger of either the snares of fools or divine judgment, look for evidence to support suspicions, find hidden motives of exploitation everywhere, and aim to escape from the chaos of life through the projection of order. Clearly then proverbial wisdom involves paranoiac knowledge.
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Job and the Other as Persecutory
Also in Job wisdom is associated with the fear of Yhwh in the sense of paranoiac knowledge of a persecutory Other vis-à-vis the subject. The book begins obviously paranoiac in viewing what happens to Job as part of a cosmic conspiracy in which by implication we are all involved. Here there is the belief in a heavenly accuser who is out to get him.
And Yhwh said to the satan, "Have you considered my servant Job, that there is none like him on the earth, a blameless and upright man, who fears God and turns away from Gericke evil? He still holds fast his integrity, although you moved me against him, to destroy him without cause" (Job 2:3).
Here the notion of the cosmic conspiracy against Job is more a possession of the book's narrator than of Job himself, who knows nothing of what transpired between Yhwh and his prosecuted. The wisdom spoken by the character Job himself can be classified as partly paranoid, 22 since his fear of Yhwh involves that he suspects, without in the story having any sufficient basis, that others are exploiting, harming, or deceiving him. Job is at times preoccupied with what may be seen as unjustified doubts about the loyalty or trustworthiness of friends or associates and often reads hidden demeaning or threatening meanings into benign remarks or events. He persistently bears grudges, i.e., is unforgiving of insults, injuries, or slights and perceives attacks on his character or reputation that are not always apparent to others. Job is also quick to react angrily or to counterattack and his exaggerations sometimes exhibit full-blown paranoia with its theology of divine persecution:
He has put my brethren far from me, and my acquaintances are wholly estranged from me. Job's ego organization is besieged by the horrors of persecutory-annihilation anxiety. Given the plethora of images and fantasies that populate the early stages of the imaginary, it becomes increasingly clearer to see how the other becomes a persecutory object. While Freud used the term 'other', referring to the other person and to otherness, Lacan's use is closer to Hegel's, especially by his lordship and bondage chapter outlined in the Phenomenology of Spirit. 23 For Hegel, one's sense of self is contingent on the recognition of the other, and this contingency itself fosters a paranoid dynamic based on fear, as is also apparent in the exchange of wisdom between Job and his friends. Job seeks the kind of recognition which is a basic human need. His ego is affirmed by the Other, but not at first. There is originally the experience of inequality vis-à-vis the deity, which is analogous to how Hegel saw the servant's relation to the master.
For the thing that I fear comes upon me, and what I dread befalls me (Job 3:25) . Then I would speak without fear of him, for I am not so in myself (Job 9:35). Surely then you will lift up your face without blemish; you will be secure, and will not fear (Job 11:9) . Their houses are safe from fear, and no rod of God is upon them (Job 21:9).
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What follows correlates neatly with recognized symptoms for paranoia, cf. Paranoid personality disorderInternational Statistic Classificaton of Diseases and Health Related Problems, 10 th Revision (CD 10). Of course, some might argue that the paranoid aspects of Job's sagely personality is due to trauma rather than due to pathological elements in wisdom. However, the fact is that Job is represented as an exemplar of a wise person and in this case represents how the wise responds to anomalies in the system in a wise manner.
Is it for your fear of him that he reproves you, and enters into judgment with you? Dominion and fear are with God; he makes peace in his high heaven (Job 25:2). And he said to man, `Behold, the fear of Yhwh, that is wisdom; and to depart from evil is understanding' (Job 28:28). …because I stood in great fear of the multitude, and the contempt of families terrified me, so that I kept silence, and did not go out of doors (Job 31:34) . Therefore men fear him; he does not regard any who are wise in their own conceit (Job 37:24).
Ultimately the desire for recognition becomes a fundamental battle for dominance and validation in which each subject struggles to overcome the objectification of the other. Job indeed comes to be seen as a persecutory object in relation to the Other.
Why do you, like God, pursue me? Why are you not satisfied with my flesh? (Job 19:22) The Other, and particularly the Other's desire, is always a potential threat to Job the subject because Yhwh is an alien force that stands in firm opposition to him. There is a perceived antithesis that evokes rivalry and competition.
He has walled up my way, so that I cannot pass, and he has set darkness upon my paths. He has stripped from me my glory, and taken the crown from my head. He breaks me down on every side, and I am gone, and my hope has he pulled up like a tree. He has kindled his wrath against me, and counts me as his adversary. His troops come on together; they have cast up siegeworks against me, and encamp round about my tent ).
If someone spoke like this in our day standard psychiatric classification is likely to diagnose paranoid personality disorder (if not of the psychotic variety). However, apologists for biblical ideology who present themselves as proponents of cross-cultural psychology seek to depathologize biblical personalities (e.g. Bruce Malina & John Pilch) to the extent that we fail to realize how we tend to employ double standards in evaluation when it comes to then and now. The bottom line is that it can't be denied that the Joban subject encounters wisdom in the face of an opposition -an opposition that desires. And for Lacan the object of human interest is the object of the other's desire. 24 What the subject desires in otherness is the Other's desire, thus bringing about a primordial confrontation with death: in opposition there is always the possibility of being annulled. The dialectic of the Joban unconscious always implies struggle, the impossibility of coexistence with the other [is] one of its possibilities. 25 Whether the other is the object of desire that enjoys a degree of liberty which the subject lacks, or whether the Other is the sages' symbolic order imposing an austere reality on the Joban subject's inner world through the violation and demands of speech, the acquisition of knowledge becomes a paranoiac enterprise.
Qohelet and the Desire not to Know
The knowledge in wisdom is basically paranoiac also in Qohelet (Ecclesiastes) in that its subject has regressed to that paranoid state whenever he expresses an extreme awareness of contingency. From many possible examples, the following text sums it up nicely: I know that whatever God does endures forever; nothing can be added to it, nor anything taken from it; God has made it so, in order that men should fear before him.....I said in my heart with regard to the sons of men that God is testing them to show them that they are but beasts. For the fate of the sons of men and the fate of beasts is the same; as one dies, so dies the other. They all have the same breath, and man has no advantage over the beasts; for all is vanity. All go to one place; all are from the dust, and all turn to dust again. Who knows whether the spirit of man goes upward and the spirit of the beast goes down to the earth? (Eccl 3:14, (18) (19) (20) (21) .
While the terrifying part-object experiences of the dislocated body arise in the imaginary, the symbolic register introduces another form of fragmentation. 26 Desire and speech by their very nature impose a command.
For when dreams increase, empty words grow many: but do you fear God (Eccl 5:7). It is good that you should take hold of this, and from that withhold not your hand; for he who fears God shall come forth from them all (Eccl 7:18) . The end of the matter; all has been heard. Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man (Eccl 12:13).
Qohelet's knowledge is saturated with paranoia because it threatens to invade the subject, and it is precisely this knowledge that must be defended against as the desire not to know.
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And while Qohelet claims one cannot know, this might as well be a case of not wanting to know either. Qohelet's wisdom is both obsessed with knowing and with denying the possibility thereof:
For who knows what is good for man while he lives the few days of his vain life, which he passes like a shadow? For who can tell man what will be after him under the sun? (Eccl. 6:12). For he does not know what is to be, for who can tell him how it will be? (Eccl 8:7). 25 Mills, Lacan on paranoiac knowledge, 33. However much man may toil in seeking, he will not find it out; even though a wise man claims to know, he cannot find it out (Eccl 8:17) . But all this I laid to heart, examining it all, how the righteous and the wise and their deeds are in the hand of God; whether it is love or hate man does not know. Everything before them is vanity (Eccl 9:1). For man does not know his time. Like fish which are taken in an evil net, and like birds which are caught in a snare, so the sons of men are snared at an evil time, when it suddenly falls upon them (Eccl 10:12). A fool multiplies words, though no man knows what is to be, and who can tell him what will be after him? (Eccl 10:14) . Give a portion to seven, or even to eight, for you know not what evil may happen on earth (Eccl 11:2). As you do not know how the spirit comes to the bones in the womb of a woman with child, so you do not know the work of God who makes everything (Eccl 11:5). In the morning sow your seed, and at evening withhold not your hand; for you do not know which will prosper, this or that, or whether both alike will be good (Eccl 11:6). Lacan would say that in agnosis there is a more fundamental unconscious that wish not to know any of the harsh realities of life. For in much wisdom is much vexation, and he who increases knowledge increases sorrow (Eccl 1:18). If a man begets a hundred children, and lives many years, so that the days of his years are many, but he does not enjoy life's good things, and also has no burial, I say that an untimely birth is better off than he. For it comes into vanity and goes into darkness, and in darkness its name is covered; moreover it has not seen the sun or known anything; yet it finds rest rather than he (Eccl 6:3-4).
Qohelet shows that wisdom in general is unable to engage in too much self-examination and change. The agnostic sage himself might not have any desire to know the root of his or her own pathological symptoms or neurotic mechanisms, what functions his or her defences serve, and why these are instituted in the first place. 28 The result is a 'sick soul' (William James) or depressive state such as the one Qohelet seems to exemplify. Yet Lacan insisted that knowers do not want to give up their symptoms because even pessimism may provide familiarity and meaning. Qohelet himself witnesses to this paradox of desire:
All this I have tested by wisdom; I said, 'I will be wise'; but it was far from me. That which is, is far off, and deep, very deep; who can find it out? (Eccl 7:23-24).
In this text, wisdom is revealed to approximate what Lacan calls the amorphous objet petit a. Joyful wisdom is singular in that for Qohelet it can literally only be seen from afar. Wisdom can only operate its fascination upon individuals who bear a partial perspective upon it, it is that object that 're-presents' the subject within the world of objects that it takes itself to be a wholly 'external' perspective upon. If a subject thus happens upon it too directly, it disappears.
29 What this indicates is that for Qohelet, wisdom as the object petit a, or at least the fascinating effect the object which bears it has upon the subject who is under its thrall, has no 'objective' reality independently of the subject. 
Gericke
The logical consequence of this, as Lacan stipulates, is that this supposedly 'lost' object (here: wisdom) can never really have been lost by the subject, since he or she can never have possessed it in the first place. 30 Qohelet's contradictions bear this out. Thus from a Lacanian perspective, wisdom is by definition an object that comes into being only by being lost. In Qohelet full wisdom resists articulation because it is simply 'the impossible,' thus subjecting consciousness to the paranoid abyss of the ineffable. 31 Still every now and again the deity returns as the repressed judge and it is with reference to this persecuting hidden ultimate reality that Qohelet recommends 'fear'. So even though knowing wisdom is felt to be beyond him, Qohelet cannot stop pursuing it. This even though there is ultimately no safety in the unknown, and that is why the phenomenology of the lived experience in Qohelet carries with it the paranoiac residue of the uncertainty of the life within. 32 From this standpoint, the quest for wisdom is revealed to be partly sadomasochistic: personified, Lady Wisdom inflicts a perverse pleasure through suffering at her own hands. There is a self-destructive element to the enjoyment of wisdom in Qohelet, a sort of revelry in the realm of excess to the point that truth or knowledge must be suspended, disavowed, or denied. 33 This is why for Qohelet and for Lacan, all knowledge becomes tainted with paranoia: they definitely threatened Qohelet's jouissance (another Lacanian term), and this was defended via developing the desire not to know, manifesting itself in a theologically realist agnosticism.
Concluding Reflections
In this article, what might possibly be considered to be the blind-spot of biblical wisdom as rooted in the fear of Yhwh was identified. It was argued that if as many texts in the Hebrew Bible state a) wisdom somehow does involve the fear of Yhwh, and that b) knowledge of some sort was held to be a necessary condition or essential property of wisdom, and that c) all knowledge is essentially paranoiac as Lacanian psycho-epistemology suggests, then we may reasonably conclude that the beginning of wisdom is, amongst other things, paranoia.
